We study the two-variable fragments D 2 and IF 2 of dependence logic and independence-friendly logic. We consider the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of these logics and show that for D 2 , both problems are NEXPTIME-complete, whereas for IF 2 , the problems are Π 0 1 and Σ 0 1 -complete, respectively. We also show that D 2 is strictly less expressive than IF 2 and that already in D 2 , equicardinality of two unary predicates and infinity can be expressed (the latter in the presence of a constant symbol).
I. INTRODUCTION
The satisfiability problem of first-order logic FO was shown to be undecidable in [5] , [29] , and ever since, logicians have been searching for decidable fragments of FO. Henkin [16] was the first to consider the logics FO k , i.e., the fragments of first-order logic with k variables. The fragments FO k , for k ≥ 3, were easily seen to be undecidable but the case for k = 2 remained open. Scott [27] then showed that FO 2 without equality is decidable. Mortimer [24] extended the result to FO 2 with equality and showed that every satisfiable FO 2 formula has a model whose size is doubly exponential in the length of the formula. His result established that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of FO 2 are contained in 2NEXPTIME. Finally, Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi [8] improved the result of Mortimer by establishing that every satisfiable FO 2 formula has a model of exponential size. Furthermore, they showed that the satisfiability problem for FO 2 is NEXPTIME-complete.
The decidability of the satisfiability problem of various extensions of FO 2 has been studied (e.g. [11] , [9] , [7] , [21] ). One such interesting extension FOC 2 is acquired by extending FO 2 with counting quantifiers ∃ ≥i . The meaning of a formula of the form ∃ ≥i xφ(x) is that φ(x) is satisfied by at least i distinct elements. The satisfiability problem for the logic FOC 2 was shown to be decidable by Grädel et al. [10] , and shown to be in 2NEXPTIME by Pacholski et al. [25] . Finally, Pratt-Hartmann [26] NEXPTIME-complete. We will later use the result of Pratt-Hartmann to determine the complexity of the satisfiability problem of the two-variable fragment of dependence logic.
In this article we study the satisfiability of the two-variable fragments of independence-friendly logic (IF) and dependence logic (D). The logics IF and D are conservative extensions of FO, i.e., they agree with FO on sentences which syntactically are FO-sentences. We thereby contribute to the understanding of the satisfiability problems of extensions of FO 2 . We briefly recall the history of IF and D. In first-order logic the order in which quantifiers are written determines dependence relations between variables. For example, when using game theoretic semantics to evaluate the formula ∀x 0 ∃x 1 ∀x 2 ∃x 3 φ, the choice for x 1 depends on the value for x 0 , and the choice for x 3 depends on the value of both universally quantified variables x 0 and x 2 . The characteristic feature of D and IF is that in these logics it is possible to express dependencies between variables that cannot be expressed in FO. The first step in this direction was taken by Henkin [15] with his partially ordered quantifiers
where x 1 depends only on x 0 and x 3 depends only on x 2 . Enderton [6] and Walkoe [32] observed that exactly the properties definable in existential second-order logic (ESO) can be expressed with partially ordered quantifiers. The second step was taken by Hintikka and Sandu [17] [18], who introduced independence-friendly logic, which extends FO in terms of so-called slashed quantifiers. For example, in ∀x 0 ∃x 1 ∀x 2 ∃x 3 /∀x 0 φ, the quantifier ∃x 3 /∀x 0 means that x 3 is "independent" of x 0 in the sense that a choice for the value of x 3 should not depend on what the value of x 0 is. The semantics of IF was first formulated in game theoretic terms, and IF can be regarded as a game theoretically motivated generalization of FO. Whereas the semantic game for FO is a game of perfect information, the game for IF is a game of imperfect information. The so-called team semantics of IF, also used in this paper, was introduced by Hodges [19] . Dependence logic, introduced by Väänänen [30] , was inspired by IF-logic, but the approach of Väänänen provided a fresh perspective on quantifier dependence. In dependence logic the dependence relations between variables are written in terms of novel atomic dependence formulas. For example, the partially ordered quantifier (1) can be expressed in dependence logic as follows
The atomic formula =(x 2 , x 3 ) has the explicit meaning that x 3 is completely determined by x 2 and nothing else.
In recent years, research related to IF and D has been active. A variety of closely related logics have been defined and various applications suggested, see e.g. [1] , [3] , [12] , [22] , [28] , [31] . While both IF and D are known to be equiexpressive to ESO, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two different logics in relation to applications is not understood well. In this article we take a step towards a better understanding of this matter. After recalling some basic properties in Section II, we compare the expressivity of the finite variable fragments of D and IF in Section III. We show that there is an effective translation from D 2 to IF 2 (Theorem III.1) and from IF 2 to D 3 (Theorem III.2). We also show that IF 2 is strictly more expressive than D 2 (Proposition III.5). This result is a by-product of our proof in Section IV that the satisfiability problem of IF 2 is undecidable (Theorem IV.13 shows Π 0 1 -completeness). The proof can be adapted to the context of finite satisfiability, i.e., the problem of determining for a given formula φ whether there is a finite structure A such that A |= φ (Theorem IV.16 shows Σ 0 1completeness). The undecidability proofs are based on tiling arguments. Finally, in Section V, we study the decidability of the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of D 2 . For this purpose we reduce the problems to the (finite) satisfiability problem for FOC 2 (Theorem V.1) and thereby show that they are NEXPTIME-complete (Theorem V.2). Table I gives an overview of previously-known as well as new complexity results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we recall the basic concepts and results relevant for this article.
The domain of a structure A is denoted by A. We assume that the reader is familiar with first-order logic FO. The extension of FO in terms of counting quantifiers ∃ ≥i is denoted by FOC. We also consider the extension FO(I) of FO by the Härtig quantifier I. The interpretation of the quantifier I is defined by the clause . , x k , distinct variables appear. In the case k = 2, we denote these variables by x and y. The existential fragment of second-order logic is denoted by ESO. For logics L and L , we write L ≤ L if for every sentence φ of L there is a sentence φ * of L such that for all structures A it holds that
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of computational complexity theory. In this article we are interested in the complexity of the satisfiability problems of various logics. For any logic L the satisfiability problem SAT(L) is defined as
The finite satisfiability problem FINSAT(L) is the analogue of SAT(L) in which we require the structure A to be finite. The following observation will be useful later.
Remark II.1. If φ is a formula over the vocabulary τ and ψ := ∃R 1 . . . ∃R n ∃f 1 . . . ∃f m φ with R 1 , . . . , R n , f 1 , . . . , f m ∈ τ , then φ is satisfiable iff the second-order formula ψ is satisfiable.
A. The logics D and IF
In this section we define independence-friendly logic and dependence logic and recall some related basic results. For IF we follow the exposition of [4] and the forthcoming monograph [23] . 
where t 1 , . . . , t n are terms.
The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ ∈ D ∪ IF is defined as for first-order logic except that we have the new cases Fr(=(t 1 , . . . , t n )) = Var(t 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(t n )
where Var(t i ) is the set of variables occurring in the term t i . If Fr(φ) = ∅, we call φ a sentence.
Definition II.4. Let τ be a relational vocabulary, i.e., τ does not contain function or constant symbols. a) The two-variable independence-friendly logic IF 2 (τ ) is generated from τ according to the following grammar:
The two-variable dependence logic D 2 (τ ) is generated from τ according to the following grammar:
Where R ∈ τ is an n-ary relation symbol, W ⊆ {x, y} and t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ {x, y}. We identify existential first-order quantifiers with existential quantifiers with empty slash sets, and therefore if W = ∅ we simply write ∃x φ(x) instead of ∃x/W φ(x). When τ is clear we often leave it out.
To simplify notation, we assume in the following that the relation symbols R ∈ τ are at most binary.
Note that in Definition II.4 we have only defined formulas in negation normal form and for that reason we do not need the slashed universal quantifier in IF 2 [19] . Defining syntax in negation normal form is customary in IF and D. A formula φ with arbitrary negations is considered an abbreviation of the negation normal form formula ψ obtained from φ by pushing the negations to the atomic level in the same fashion as in first-order logic. It is important to note that the game theoretically motivated negation ¬ of D and IF does not satisfy the law of excluded middle and is therefore not the classical Boolean negation. This is manifested by the existence of sentences φ such that for some A we have A |= φ and A |= ¬φ.
In order to define the semantics of IF and D, we first need to define the concept of a team. Let A be a model with the domain A. Assignments over A are finite functions that map variables to elements of A. The value of a term t in an assignment s is denoted by t A s . If s is an assignment, x a variable, and a ∈ A, then s(a/x) denotes the assignment (with the domain dom(s) ∪ {x}) which agrees with s everywhere except that it maps x to a.
Let A be a set and {x 1 , . . . , x k } a finite (possibly empty) set of variables. A team X of A with the domain dom(X) = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is any set of assignments from the variables {x 1 , . . . , x k } into the set A. We denote by rel(X) the k-ary relation of A corresponding to X
We are now ready to define the semantics of IF and D.
Definition II.5 ([19] , [30] ). Let A be a model and X a team of A. The satisfaction relation A |= X φ is defined as follows:
For IF we further have the following rules:
And for D we have the additional rules:
Above, we assume that the domain of X contains Fr(φ).
From Definition II.5 it follows that many familiar propositional equivalences of connectives do not hold in D and IF. For example, the idempotence of disjunction fails, which can be used to show that the distributivity laws of disjunction and conjunction do not hold either. We refer to [30, Section 3.3] for a detailed exposition on propositional equivalences of connectives in D (and also IF).
B. Basic properties of D and IF
In this section we recall some basic properties of D and IF.
Let X be a team with the domain {x 1 , . . . , x k } and V ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x k }. We denote by X V the team {s V | s ∈ X} with the domain V . The following proposition shows that the truth of a D-formula depends only on the interpretations of the variables occurring free in the formula.
Proposition II.6 ([30], [4] ). Let φ ∈ D be any formula or
The analogue of Proposition II.6 does not hold for open formulas of IF. In other words, the truth of an IF-formula may depend on the interpretations of variables that do not occur in the formula. For example, the truth of the formula
in a team X with domain {x, y, z} depends on the values of z in X, although z does not occur in φ.
The following fact is a fundamental property of all formulas of D and IF:
The expressive power of sentences of D and IF coincides with that of existential second-order sentences:
Proof: The fact ESO ≤ D (and ESO ≤ IF) is based on the analogous result of [6] , [32] for partially ordered quantifiers. For the converse inclusions, see [30] and [20] .
Proposition II.9 ([30], [19] ). Let φ be a formula of D or IF without dependence atoms and without slashed quantifiers, i.e., φ is syntactically a first-order formula. Then for all A and X:
III. COMPARISON OF IF AND D
In this section we show that
We also further discuss the expressive powers and other logical properties of D 2 and IF 2 .
Lemma III.1. For any formula φ ∈ D 2 there is a formula φ * ∈ IF 2 such that for all structures A and teams X, where dom(X) = {x, y}, it holds that
Proof: The translation φ → φ * is defined as follows. For first-order literals it is defined as the identity. For connectives and quantifiers the translation is defined in the obvious inductive way. The only non-trivial cases are the dependence atoms:
Note that a negation of a dependence atom can be translated by ¬x = x. The claim of the lemma can now be proved using induction on φ.
Next we show a translation from IF 2 to D 3 .
Lemma III.2. For any formula φ ∈ IF 2 there is a formula φ * ∈ D 3 such that for all structures A and teams X, where dom(X) = {x, y}, it holds that
Proof: The claim follows by the following translation φ → φ * : For atomic and negated atomic formulas the translation is the identity, and for propositional connectives and first-order quantifiers it is defined in the obvious inductive way. The only non-trivial cases are the slashed quantifiers:
Again, the claim can be proved using induction on φ.
For sentences, Lemmas III.1 and III.2 now imply the following.
Proof: The claim follows by Lemmas III.1 and III.2. First of all, if φ is a sentence of IF or D, then, by Proposition II.6, for every model A and team X = ∅
It is important to note that, even if φ ∈ D 2 is a sentence, it may happen that φ * has free variables since variables in W are regarded as free in subformulas of φ * of the form ∃x/W ψ. However, this is not a problem. Let Y be the set of all assigments of A with the domain {x, y}. Now
where the first and the last equivalences hold by (2), the second by the semantics of the universal quantifier and the third by Lemma III.1. An analogous argument can be used to show that for every sentence φ ∈ IF 2 there is an equivalent sentence of the logic D 3 .
A. Examples of properties definable in D 2
We end this section with examples of definable classes of structures in D 2 (and in IF 2 by Theorem III.3). can express that A is infinite. c) |A| ≤ k can be expressed already in D 1 .
Proof: Let us first consider part a). Clearly, it suffices to express |P | ≤ |Q|. Define φ by φ := ∀x∃y(=(y, x) ∧ (¬P (x) ∨ Q(y))).
For part b), we use the same idea as above. Define ψ by ψ := ∀x∃y(=(y, x) ∧ ¬c = y).
Finally, we show how to express the property from part c). Define θ as ∀x(
It is interesting to note that, although part a) holds, the difference in SAT-complexity of FO 2 (I) and D 2 is a major one. The former is Σ 1 1 -hard [11] whereas the latter is decidable -as is shown in section V. Part a) also implies that D 2 does not have a zero-one law, since the property |P | ≤ |Q| (which can be expressed in D 2 ) has the limit probability 1 2 . Proposition III.5. D 2 < IF 2 . This holds already in the finite.
Proof: The property of being grid-like (see Definition IV.9) can be expressed in IF 2 but not in D 2 since D 2 is decidable by Theorem V.2. In the finite, there exists no D 2 sentence equivalent to the IF 2 sentence φ torus (see Section IV-A), since the finite satisfiability problem of D 2 is decidable.
IV. SATISFIABILITY FOR IF 2 IS UNDECIDABLE
In this section we will use tiling problems, introduced by Hao Wang in [33] , to show the undecidability of SAT(IF 2 ) as well as FINSAT(IF 2 ).
In this paper a Wang tile is a square in which each edge is assigned a color. It is a square that has four colors (up, right, down, left). We say that a set of tiles can tile the N×N plane if a tile can be placed on every point (i, j) ∈ N × N s.t. the right color of the tile in (i, j) is the same as the left color of the tile in (i + 1, j) and the up color of the tile in (i, j) is the same as the down color in the tile in (i, j + 1). Notice that turning and flipping tiles is not allowed.
We then define some specific structures needed later.
Definition IV.1. The model G := (G, V, H) where
Definition IV.2. A set of colors C is defined to be an arbitrary finite subset of the natural numbers. The set of all (Wang) tiles over C is C 4 , i.e., a tile is an ordered list of four colors, interpreted as the colors of the four edges of the tile in the order top, right, bottom and left.
Let C be a set of colors, T ⊆ C 4 a finite set of tiles and A = (A, V, H) a first-order structure with binary relations V and H interpreted as vertical and horizontal successor relations. Then a T -tiling of A is a total function t : A → T such that for all x, y ∈ A it holds that i) (t(x)) 0 = (t(y)) 2 if (x, y) ∈ V , i.e., the top color of x matches the bottom color of y, and ii) (t(x)) 1 = (t(y)) 3 if (x, y) ∈ H, i.e., the right color of
x matches the left color of y.
Next we define the tiling problem for a structure A = (A, V, H). {T | there is a torus D that is T -tilable}.
Definition IV.3 (TILING). A structure
Note that the set TILING(G) consists of all T such that there is a T -tiling of the infinite grid and TILING(Torus) consists of all T such that there is a periodic T -tiling of the grid. Further note that TILING(Torus) cannot be expressed in the form TILING(D) for a fixed torus D since a fixed torus has a fixed size and we want the problem to be the question whether there is a torus of any size.
We will later use the following two theorems to show the undecidability of SAT(IF 2 ) and, resp., FINSAT(IF 2 ).
Theorem IV.4 ([2], [14] ). TILING(G) is Π 0 1 -complete. Theorem IV.5 ([13, Lemma 2]). TILING(Torus) is Σ 0 1complete.
To prove the undecidability of SAT(IF 2 ) (Theorem IV.13) we will, for every set of tiles T , define a formula φ T such that A |= φ T iff A has a T -tiling. Then we will define another formula φ grid and show that A |= φ grid iff A contains (an isomorphic copy of) the grid as a substructure. Therefore φ T ∧ φ grid is satisfiable if and only if there is a T -tiling of the grid. For the undecidability of FINSAT(IF 2 ) (Theorem IV.16) we will define a formula φ torus which is a modification of the formula φ grid .
Definition IV.6. Let T = {t 0 , . . . , t k } be a set of tiles, and for all i ≤ k, let right(t i ) (resp. top(t i )) be the set
i.e., the set of tiles matching t i to the right (resp. top).
Then we define the first-order formulas
over the vocabulary V, H, P 0 , . . . , P k . In an IF or D context, φ → ψ is considered to be an abbreviation of φ ¬ ∨ ψ, where φ ¬ is the negation normal form of ¬φ. Notice that φ T is an FO 2 -sentence. Therefore T -tiling is expressible even in FO 2 . The difficulty lies in expressing that a structure is (or at least contains) a grid. This is the part of the construction where FO 2 or even D 2 formulas are no longer sufficient and the full expressivity of IF 2 is needed. The grid-likeness of a structure can alternatively be described in the following more intuitive way.
Remark IV.10. A structure A = (A, V, H) is grid-like iff i) V and H are (graphs of) injective total functions, i.e., the out-degree of every element is exactly one and the in-degree at most one (φ infinite , φ functional and φ injective ), ii) there is an element, called the root, that does not have any predecessors (φ root ), iii) for every element, its V successor is distinct from its H successor (φ distinct ), iv) for every element x such that x does not have a V (resp. H) predecessor, the H (resp. V ) successor of x also does not have a V (resp. H) predecessor (φ edge ), v) for every element x there is an element y such that
Proof: We show that a structure B |= φ grid satisfies the above five properties. The only difficult case is property v). First note that φ join is equivalent to the first-order formula ∀x∃x ∀y V (x, y) ∨ H(x, y) → V (y, x ) ∨ H(y, x ) .
Since φ functional , φ distinct and φ infinite hold as well, B satisfies ∀x∃x ∃y 1 ∃y 2
.
From this formula the property v) is immediate (with x := x and y := x ). Now we will use Remark IV.10 to show that a grid-like structure, although it need not be the grid itself, must at least contain an isomorphic copy of the grid as a substructure.
Theorem IV.11. Let A = (A, V, H) be a grid-like structure. Then A contains an isomorphic copy of G as a substructure.
Proof: If B is a model with two binary relations R and R , b ∈ B and i ∈ N then the i-b-generated substructure of B (denoted by B i (b)) is defined inductively in the following way:
Let r ∈ A be a root of A (which exists because A |= φ root ). We call a point a ∈ A a west border point (resp. south border point) if (r, a) ∈ V n (resp. (r, a) ∈ H n ) for some n ∈ N. Due to Remark IV.10, every point in A has V -and H-in-degree at most one while the west border points have H-in-degree zero and the south border points have V -in-degree zero. We call a substructure H of A indegree complete if every point in H has the same in-degrees in H as it has in A.
We will prove by induction that there exists a family of
The basis of the induction is trivial. Clearly the function f 0 defined by f 0 ((0, 0)) := r is an isomorphism from G 0 ((0, 0)) to A 0 (r). And since r is a root it has no Vor H-predecessors. Hence, A 0 (r) is in-degree complete. Let us then assume that f k is an isomorphism from G k ((0, 0)) to A k (r), A k (r) is in-degree complete and f k−1 ⊆ f k . Then the kr-generated substructure of A k+1 (r) (which is A k (r)) is isomorphic to G k ((0, 0) ) and the isomorphism is given by f k .
We will now show how to extend f k to the isomorphism f k+1 . This is done by extending f k element by element along the diagonal (Figure 1 shows the first extension step). We will abuse notation and denote the extensions of the function f k by h throughout the proof. We will show by induction on j that we can extend the isomorphism by assigning values for h(j, (k + 1) − j) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k + 1 -still maintaining the isomorphism between G dom(h) and A range(h), and the in-degree completeness of A range(h).
Due to φ infinite and φ functional the west border point f k ((0, k) ) has a unique V -successor a. Since the kr-generated substructure of A k+1 (r) is isomorphic to G k ((0, 0)) and (0, k) has no V successor in G k ((0, 0) ) we know that f k (y) = a for every y ∈ G k ((0, 0) ). Note that due to φ edge and since f k ((0, k) ) is a west border point and has no H-predecessors in A, a is also a west border point and has no H-predecessor in A. Thus A (range(h) ∪ {a}) is in-degree complete. Since A range(h) is in-degree complete, a has no V ∪ H-successors in range(h). Due to φ edge and φ injective , a has no reflexive loops. We extend h by h((0, k + 1)) := a. Clearly the extended function h is an isomorphism and A range(h) in-degree complete. Now let m ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and assume that h((j, (k + 1) − j)) is defined for all j ≤ m, h is an isomorphism extending f k and h(G) is in-degree complete. We will prove that we can extend h by assigning a value for h(m + 1, (k + 1)−(m+1)), still maintaining the required properties. By the induction hypothesis we have defined a value for h((m, (k + 1) − m)).
Now h((m, (k + 1) − m)) is the V 2 -successor of h((m, (k − 1) − m)). Since h((m, (k − 1) − m)) has no H 2 successor in the structure A range(h), the H 2 -and V 2 -successors of h((m, (k − 1) − m)) in A cannot be the same point. Now by Remark IV.10v, this implies that there is a point c ∈ A \ range(h) such that c is the H • Vand V • H-successor of h((m, (k − 1) − m)) in A. We extend h by h((m + 1, k − m)) := c and observe that A (range(h)∪{c}) is still in-degree complete. By φ injective and in-degree completeness of A (range(h) \ {c}), the extended function h is an isomorphism.
Finally we extend the south border. This is possible by reasoning similar to the case where we extended the west border.
Let f k+1 be the isomorphism from G k+1 ((0, 0)) to A k+1 (r) that exists by the inductive proof. Clearly A k+1 (r) is in-degree complete and f k ⊆ f k+1 . Now since the isomorphisms f i for i ∈ N constitute an ascending chain, i∈N f i is an isomorphism from G to a substructure of A. Therefore A has an isomorphic copy of the grid as a substructure.
The last tool needed to prove the main theorem is the following trivial lemma.
Lemma IV.12. Let T be a set of tiles and B = (B, V, H) a structure. Then B is T -tilable iff there is a structure A which is T -tilable and contains a substructure that is isomorphic to B.
The following is the main theorem of this section. To see that g indeed is such a reduction, first let T be a set of tiles such that G is T -tilable. Then, by Lemma IV.7, it follows that there is an expansion G * of G such that G * |= φ T . Clearly, G * |= φ grid and therefore G * |= φ grid ∧ φ T . If, on the other hand, A * is a structure such that A * |= φ grid ∧ φ T , then by Theorem IV.11, the {V, H}-reduct A of A * contains an isomorphic copy of G as a substructure. Furthermore, by Lemma IV.7, A is T -tilable. Hence, by Lemma IV.12, G is T -tilable.
A. Finite satisfiability for IF 2 is undecidable
We will now discuss the problem FINSAT(IF 2 ) whose undecidability proof is similar to the above, the main difference being that it uses tilings of tori instead of tilings of the grid. By a proper torus we mean a torus D such that the finite grid (D, V, H) is not of the type 1 × n or n × 1 for any n ∈ N. It can be proved that there is a sentence φ torus ∈ IF 2 such that for all finite structures A = (A, V, H, V , H ), if A |= φ torus then A is torus-like, and furthermore, every proper torus satisfies φ torus . The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem IV.11. Expressing that a finite structure has a finite grid as a component is done essentially in the same way as expressing that a structure has a copy of the infinite grid as a substructure.
We say that the structure A = (A, 15 . Let A = (A, V, H, V , H ) be a finite structure with A |= φ torus . Then there is a torus D such that A contains an isomorphic copy of a topping of D as a substructure.
Proof: Immediate from Definition IV.14 and the definition of a torus, i.e., Definition IV.1.
The following theorem is the finite analogue of Theorem IV.13.
Theorem IV. 16 . FINSAT(IF 2 ) is Σ 0 1 -complete. Proof: For the upper bound, note that since all finite structures can be recursively enumerated and the model checking problem of IF 2 over finite models is clearly decidable, we have FINSAT(IF 2 ) ∈ Σ 0 1 . The lower bound follows by a reduction g from TILING(Torus) to our problem defined by g(T ) := φ torus ∧ γ T . To see that g indeed is such a reduction, first let T be a set of tiles such that there is a torus D which is T -tilable. Therefore there clearly exists a proper torus D that is T -tilable. Then, by Lemma IV.8, it follows that there is an expansion D * of D such that D * |= γ T . We have D * |= φ torus and therefore D * |= φ torus ∧γ T . If, on the other hand, A * is a finite structure such that A * |= φ torus ∧ γ T , then by Lemma IV.15, A * has a substructure B * + , which is an expansion of an isomorphic copy of a topping of a torus B. Furthermore, by Lemma IV.8, the {V, V , H, H }-reduct A of the structure A * is T -tilable. Hence, by the obvious analogue of Lemma IV.12, the {V, V , H,
In this section we show that SAT(D 2 ) and FINSAT(D 2 ) are NEXPTIME-complete. Our proof uses the fact that SAT(FOC 2 ) and FINSAT(FOC 2 ) are NEXPTIME-complete [26] .
where R i is of arity at most 2 and ψ ∈ FOC 2 , such that for all A and teams X with dom(X) = Fr(φ) it holds that
where (A, rel(X)) is the expansion A of A into vocabulary τ ∪ {R} defined by R A := rel(X).
Proof: Using induction on φ we will first translate φ into a sentence τ φ ∈ ESO[τ ∪ {R}] satisfying (3). Then we note that τ φ can be translated into an equivalent sentence φ * that also satisfies the syntactic requirement of the theorem. The proof is a modification of the proof from [30, Theorem 6.5 ]. Below we write φ(x, y) to indicate that Fr(φ) = {x, y}. Also, the quantified relations S and T below are assumed not to appear in τ ψ and τ θ . 1) Let φ(x, y) ∈ {x = y, ¬x = y, P (x, y), ¬P (x, y)}.
The sentence τ φ is defined as ∀x∀y(R(x, y) → φ(x, y)).
2) Let φ(x, y) be of the form =(x, y). The sentence τ φ is defined as ∀x∃ ≤1 yR(x, y).
3) Let φ(x, y) be of the form ¬=(x, y). The sentence τ φ is defined as ∀x∀y¬R(x, y). 
7)
Let φ(x) be of the form ∀yψ(x, y). The sentence τ φ is now defined as ∃S(τ ψ (R/S) ∧ ∀x∀y(R(x) → S(x, y))).
It is worth noting that in the translation above we have not displayed all the possible cases, e.g., φ of the form =(x) or P (x), for which τ φ is defined analogously to the above.
A straightforward induction on φ shows that τ φ can be transformed into φ * of the form
where ψ and θ i are quantifier-free.
Note that if φ ∈ D 2 is a sentence, the relation symbol R is 0-ary and rel(X) is either ∅ (which corresponds to ⊥) or {∅} (which corresponds to ). Hence, Theorem V.1 implies that for an arbitrary sentence φ ∈ D 2 [τ ] there is a sentence φ * (R/ ) ∈ ESO[τ ] such that for all A it holds that
It is worth noting that, if φ ∈ D 2 does not contain any dependence atoms, i.e., φ ∈ FO 2 , the sentence φ * is of the form ∃R 1 . . . ∃R k (∀x∀yψ ∧ i ∀x∃yθ i ) and the first-order part of this is in Scott normal form. So, in Theorem V.1 we essentially translate formulas of D 2 into Scott normal form [27] . Theorem V.1 now implies the following:
Theorem V.2. SAT(D 2 ) and FINSAT(D 2 ) are NEXPTIMEcomplete.
Proof: Let φ ∈ D 2 be a sentence. Then, by (4) are NEXPTIME-hard [8] , it follows that SAT(D 2 ) and FINSAT(D 2 ) are as well.
VI. CONCLUSION We have studied the complexity of the two-variable fragments of dependence logic and independence-friendly logic. We have shown (Theorem V.2) that both the satisfiablity and finite satisfiability problems for D 2 are decidable, NEXPTIME-complete to be exact. We have also proved (Theorems IV.13 and IV.16) that both problems are undecidable for IF 2 ; the satisfiability and finite satisfiabity problems for IF 2 are Π 0 1 -complete and Σ 0 1 -complete, respectively. While the full logics D and IF are equivalent over sentences, we have shown that the finite variable variants D 2 and IF 2 are not, the latter being more expressive. This was obtained as a by-product of the deeper result concerning the decidability barrier between these two logics.
There are many open questions related to these logics. We conclude with two of them: 1) What is the complexity of the validity problems of D 2 and IF 2 ? 2) Is it possible to define NP-complete problems in D 2 or in IF 2 ?
